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firm which lacks monopolistic position in all individual phases of its activities
can be distinguished from a U. S. Steel, a movie chain that wields the lever-
age of "closed" towns against competitors in "open" towns, or tobacco
manufacturers who act in tacit concert both in buying and selling. 2 Mass
buying power does not in itself mean the power to raise price, drive out all
existing rivals, or foreclose new competition.
A realistic appraisal of the actual behavior of market forces justifies the
continued existence of the kind of "monopoly power" possessed by A&P.08
Since this power is entirely consistent with competition in a real sense, the
courts would do no violence to the Sherman Act in letting it pass.
INTEREST ON TAX ARREARAGES AFTER BANKRUPTCY
INTEREST on a debtor's unpaid obligations normally ceases to accrue when
a bankruptcy petition is filed.' This rule has no explicit statutory founda-
tion,2 but stems from principles of equity and administrative convenience.'
62. See Schine, Griffith and Tobacco cases, supra note 2.
63. Perhaps the groundwork for protection of massed buying power was laid in tile
Griffith case:
"Large-scale buying is not, of course, unlawful per se. It may yield price or other
lavful advantages to the buyer. It may not, however, be used to monopolize or to at-
tempt to monopolize interstate trade or commerce. Nor ... may it be used to stifle
competition by denying competitors less favorably situated access to the market." United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948).
Moreover, the Court in the Columbia Steel case attempted an over-all consideration of
the character of a market, stating, for example, that ". . . [tlhe relative effect of per-
centage command of a market varies with the setting in which that factor is placed."
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 528 (1948). See Rostow, Monopoly
under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43 ILt. L. Rnv. 745, 779 (1949) ; Note, Te
Columbia Steel Case: New Light on Old Antitrust Problems, 58 YALE L. 3. 764 (1949).
* City of New York v. Saper, 69 S.Ct. 554 (1949).
1. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339 (1911). See Vanston Bondholders Protective
Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 (1946). Outside of bankruptcy, the rule is applied
in equity receivership, Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95, 116 (1893) ; and statu-
tory schemes for bank liquidation, Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U.S.
131 (1899). In effect, a similar rule is applied in corporate reorganizations. See note 3
infra. For a general discussion of interest claims in insolvency proceedings see Hanson,
Effect of Insolvency Proceedings on Creditor's Right to Interest, 32 Micui. L. REv.
1069 (1934); Clark, Contingent and Immature Claims in Receivership Proceedings, 29
YALE L. J. 481, 486-7 (1920); 3 CoLLIER oxr BANKRUPTcY 1835 (14th ed., Moore and
Oglebay 1941 and Cum. Supp. 1948) (hereinafter cited as CoLLIER).
2. The rule is of English origin. The British bankruptcy system did not allow in-
terest beyond the date of commission, i.e., petition. Bromley v. Goodere, 1 Atk. 75, 26
Eng. Rep. 49 (1743) ; Ex parte Bennet, 2 Atk. 526, 26 Eng. Rep. 716 (1743) ; 2 BL.
Comm. *488. More recent cases have reached similar results, e.g., In re London, Windsor
and Greenwich Hotels (Quartermaine's Case) [1892] 1 Ch. 639. But cf. In re Talbott,
39 Ch. D. 567 (1886). The Supreme Court has held that this rule was taken over into
American bankruptcy legislation. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911).
3. In those cases where neither equity nor convenience were factors, English bank-
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By denying interest on all unsecured claims, no class of creditors can profit
from the legally imposed delays incident to the scheme of orderly liquida-
tion provided for the benefit of unsecured creditors. 4 In addition, the
necessity for constantly revaluing each creditor's proportionate share in
the estate is avoided. 5
ruptcy administration relaxed the rule. Thus interest was allowed secured creditors
where interest or dividends accrued on the security after the date of the puition or where
the proceeds of the security were adequate to pay both interest and principal. Ex tarte
Ramsbottom, 2 Mont. and Ayrt. 79 (1835) (interest palable out of earnings on property) ;
I; re London, Windsor and Greenwich Hotels (Quartermaine's Case), [18921 1 Ch.
639 (secured creditor entitled to interest when proceeds realized from sale were ade-
quate). In rare instances, where the bankrupt proved to be solvent, creditors were
awarded interest accruing after adjudication. E.g., Bromley v. Goodere, 1 Ath. 75, 26
Eng. Rep. 49 (1743).
These exceptions have been carried over into the American bankruptcy system. Se:x-
ton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911) : Spring Coal Co. v. Keech, 239 Fed. 48 (4th Cir.
1916) (interest accruing after the filing of a petition allowed a fecured creditor in a re-
ceivership where the proceeds of the security permitted) ; Johnson v. Norris, 19D Fed. 459
(5th Cir. 1911) (interest permitted where sufficiency of assets develops during liquidation).
In effect, allowance of interest hinges on adequacy of assets in both ban:ruptcv
and corporate reorganizations proceedings. Corporate reorganization deals with secured
debts. On these claims the general rule is said to be that interest accrues until the ef-
fective date of the reorganization plan and must be accorded the same priority as the
principal of the claim. Standard Gas & Electric Co. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F2d
615 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941). See Notes, I0 YAmm I J. 144
(1940); 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 399, 464 (1941). Contra: Matter of Narcor 'Mfg. Co.,
36 F.Supp. 978 (E.D.Wis. 1941). But though normally allowed in reorganizations, in-
terest is denied where mortgaged assets are inadequate to meet the claims of bondholders
and free assets are inadequate to satisfy the deficiency with interest.as well as unsecured
claims plus interest. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Aih, aukee, St Paul
and Pacific Ry., 318 U.S. 523 (1943) ; 6 Commnus 2817-4. Similarly, in bankruptcy, secured
creditors receive interest when their security is adequate. See cases cited sutra. For
any deficiencies, they become unsecured creditors and like other unsecured creditors re-
ceive interest only when a sufficiency of assets develops during liquidation.
4. "[Denial of interest is a] necessary and enforced rule of distribution due to the
fact that ... assets are generally insufficient to pay debts in full. If all claims were of
equal dignity and all bore the same rate of interest ... it would be immaterial whether
the dividend was calculated on the basis of the principal alone or of the principal and
interest combined. But some of the debts might carry a high rate of interest and some
a low rate, and hence inequality would result in the payment of interest which accrued
during the delay incident to collecting and distributing the funds. As this delay was the
act of law, no one should thereby gain an advantage or suffer a loss." American Iron &
Steel 'Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266 (1914).
The rule is sometimes rationalized on the ground that the debtor should not pay
interest during a period in which he is deprived of the use of his property. Tredcgar Co. v.
Seaboard Airline Ry., 183 Fed. 289 (4th Cir. 1910).
5. "[I]f interest were to accrue . . . after the adjudication, the amount of the
several claims would vary from time to time, according to their respective rates of in-
terest, and the proportionate share of the several creditors would be subject to constant
readjustment... If, at the declaration of every dividend, a new basis of apportion-
ment were required, the administration of the estate would be seriously complicated" In
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Neither the Chandler Act nor its predecessors specifically exempted any
class of claims from the scope of this judicially created rule.' But courts,
under early legislation, permitted federal, state and local claims for pre-
bankruptcy taxes to draw interest until paid; 7 and they continued the
exception even under later Acts although the same considerations of equity
and practicality which led to disallowance of post-bankruptcy interest oil
other claims had become equally applicable.' Commentators have long
criticized this exception as irrational and unjust.' In the recent case of
re Kallak, 147 Fed. 276, 277-8 (D.C.N.D. 1906); see Note, 61 HARV. L. Rpv. 354
(1948) ; 3 COLLIER 1836.
6. First American bankruptcy legislation created a priority only for all debts due
the United States. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 STAT. 19, 36 (1800), repealed, 2 STAT. 248
(1803). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 STAT. 440, 444 (1841), repealed, 5 STAr.
614 (1843), priorities were established for all debts due the United States, debts owing
a person as a surety entitled to preference, and wage claims up to $25 for labor per-
formed within 6 months of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 STAT. 517, 531
(1867), gave taxes a priority just below administrative costs, with taxes due the United
States payable prior to state taxes; priority of wage claims inferior to taxes was in-
creased to $50. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 STAT. 544, 563 (1898), elaborated this
system of priority claims and placed federal and state tax debts on a par, ahead of ad-
ministrative costs. But no provision was made for post-bankruptcy interest on any type
of claim. Neither the 1926 amendments, 44 STAT. 662 (1926), nor the Chandler Act, 52
STAT. 840 (1938), incorporated any provision for post-bankruptcy interest, although the
scheme of distribution was altered in both enactments. See Hunt, Tax Claims in Banik-
ruptcy Proceedings, 14 J.N.A.REF.BANXR. 3 (1939) ; 3 COLLIER 2045-53.
7. The exception for tax claims appears to have originated with hn re Kallak, 147
Fed. 276 (D.C.N.D.1906). In the same year, the court in In re Fisher, 148 Fed. 907
(D.C.NJ.1906), reached an opposite conclusion on the ground that the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 did not provide for such interest payments. But the Fisher case was ignored
and the Kallak case generally followed, usually without discussion. E.g., In re Ashland
Emery & Corundum Co., 229 Fed. 829 (D. Mass. 1916).
Never has the exception extended to more than tax liabilities. Thus, even though
52 STAT. 840, 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (4) (1946), establishes a fifth priority for
unsecured non-tax debts owing the United States, it has never been held that such
claims draw interest after bankruptcy.
Interest on pre-bankruptcy tax claims must be clearly distinguished from interest
on unpaid post-bankruptcy taxes. Interest on the latter is always allowed as a first
priority charge on the estate. Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57 (1939). For a general
discussion of tax problems arising during bankruptcy, see Wurzel, Taxation Dtritig
Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HAv. L. REV. 1141 (1942); Note, 29 VA. L. REV. 206
(1942).
8. These later acts did not deter lower courts from adhering to their established
practice and allowing post-bankruptcy interest on tax claims without much comment.
E.g., In re L. Gandolfi, 42 F.Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.1940). And the practice was likewise
sustained in Davie v. Green, 133 F2d 451 (1st Cir. 1943), even after exploration of the
possible significance of changes in the bankruptcy law, although the court conceded that
favored treatment of tax claims was inequitable and unjust. Id. at 453; see Note, 96
U. OF PA. L. REv. 270 (1948).
9. See 3 CoLLIER 1841-4; Olive, Taxes in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 25 TAxvs 5
(1947) ; Notes, 61 H~av. L. REv. 354 (1948) ; 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Ray. 516, 518 (1948). Several
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City of New York v. Saper,1" the Supreme Court, squarely presented with the
issue for the first time, by an 8-1 decision eliminated the preferential treat-
ment accorded these claims."
Underlying the prior judicial practice of allowing interest were the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,12 which clearly preferred tax claims
over all other debts. While ordinary creditors were required to file and
prove their claims,13 an affirmative duty was laid on the trustee to ascertain
from a search of the tax rolls the amount due for taxes and to secure an order
for payment from the bankruptcy court.' 4 Unlike ordinary claims, tax
courts, too, have expressed dissatisfaction with the rule. See, e.g., the statement in In re
Union Fabrics, 73 F.Supp. 685, 687 (S.D.N.Y.1947), that the rule ,as "neither logical,
sound, nor just" See also the opinion of the referees in Matter of Dorsey, 46 Am. B.R.
(N.S.) 146, 147 (W. D. Wash. 1940) and Matter of Summers, 45 AmB.R. (NI.S.) 123,
128 (N.D. Ohio 1939).
10. 69 S.Ct. 554 (1949), aff'g Saper v. City of New York, 163 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1948).
11. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court because of a conflict between the
First and Second Circuits. The First Circuit, in Davie v. Green, 133 F2d 451 (1st Cir.
1943), rev'g Matter of Union Beverage Co., 50 Am. B. R. (N.S.) 8-5 (N.Hamp.1942),
decided that the Chandler Act did not authorize courts to abandon the customary practice
of alloving interest on tax claims. Reasons stated in Davie v. Green, stspra, persuaded
Mr. Justice Reed to become a solitary dissenter when the issue reached the Supreme Court
in City of New York v. Saper, 69 S.Ct. 544 (1949).
The Second Circuit, however, by a quirk in the judicial calendar, came to a different
conclusion. A dictum in Hammer v. Tuffy, 145 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir. 1944), while ad-
mitting that earlier holdings had permitted interest on tax claims to run until the date of
payment, declared that "whether the priority of taxes ... includes interest must there-
fore be regarded as an open question" since the passage of the Chandler Act. Two
trustees accepted this open invitation to litigation. In the first case to arise, In rc Union
Fabrics, 73 F.Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.1947), the court denied interest; in the second, In re
Spotlight Productions, 75 F.Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y.1947) the court followed the rule in
Davie v. Green. On appeal, these cases were assigned for argument to benches composed
of different personnel and the later Spotlight case was decided first. A unanimous court
(Judge Clark writing the opinion with Judges L. Hand and Swan concurring) reversed
the lower court and directed that the interest claim be denied. Sub noma. Saper v. City
of New York, 168 F2d 263 (2d Cir. 1948). When the Union Fabrics case was decided,
only one of the judges participating in the prior Saper case (Judge Clark) was on the
bench. Feeling itself bound, the reconstituted court affirmed the Union Fabrics case and
once more disallowed an interest claim. Sub nowa. Carter v. United States, 163 F2d 272
(2d Cir. 1948). But the opinion of Judge A. Hand expressly stated that he and Judge
Chase agreed with the decision in Davie v. Green, supra, and acquiesced in the holding of
the Union Fabrics case only because it was in accord vith the views of a majority of
judges in the Second Circuit as e-xpressed in the Saper case. Had the Carter case been
decided first, no conflict in the circuits would have developed and the Supreme Court
might not have granted certiorari. See Snedecor, Taxes and Tax Claims, 23 J. N. A.
REF. BANmL. 47 (1949).
12. 30 STAT. 544 (1898). For a general discussion of this legislation, see HamuA Aim
MCLAUGHLIN, THE BA RuRPTcY Acr oF 189S (2d ed. 1947).
13. § 57(n), 30 STAT. 544, 561 (1898).
14. § 64, 30 STAT. 544, 563 (18).
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claims shared in the distribution of the debtor's non-exempt assets even
when, not properly filed. They were not subject to discharge and were di.
rected to be paid in full with an absolute priority over all other debts. 16
Since tax claims were singled out as sui generis for these purposes, courts
were easily persuaded to go one step further and grant tax claimants the
right to post-bankruptcy interest as well. Under the 1898 Act no barrier
was found in the considerations of administrative inconvenience which
generally precluded allowance of interest on other claims: since no one could
share in any dividend until tax claims, including interest, were paid in full,
there was no need for constant recomputation of each creditor's share.
But subsequent amendments to the bankruptcy law, culminating in the
Chandler Act, have eliminated many distinctions between tax claims and
other debts.1 6 Although tax claims remain non-dischargeable," the provi-
sion that the court order the trustee to pay all "taxes legally due and owing"
was deliberately eliminated. Instead, tax claims must now be filed and
proved like other debts.' 8 Consequently, tax claimants do not share in the
distribution of the estate if they fail to prove their claims within the stat-
utory period. Moreover, tax claims have been relegated to a fourth priority,
yielding in precedence to administrative costs, certain wage claims and
specified creditor's expenses.' 9 Since immediate settlement of debts is neces-
15. § 17, 30 STAT. 544, 550 (1898), made unpaid taxes non-dischargeable, a proviso
carried over into the present bankruptcy law. See notes 17 and 35 infra. The absolute
priority conferred by § 64, 30 STAT. 544, 563 (1898), however, was altered in 1926. See
note 19 infra.
16. Judge Clark, writing the lower court opinion in Saper v. City of New York, 168
F.2d 268,-270 (2d Cir. 1948), emphasized the fact that "the process of assimilation of
tax claims to other debts appears, to us at least, to have been completed by the Chandler
Amendments of 1938." This "loss of prestige" argument was earlier recognized in United
States v. Roth, 164 F.2d 575, 577, 578 (2d Cir. 1948). See 3 CouLaa 1841, and WamsluN,
THE BANK rUPTC LAW OF 1938 133-4 (1938).
17. § 17(a), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (1946): "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such
as (1) are due as a tax levied by the United States or any State, county or municipal-
ity. .. ." For a discussion of reasons underlying retention of this provision and recent
proposals to eliminate it, see note 35 infra.
18. §57(n), 11 U.S.C. §93(n) (1946), provides that: "all claims provable under
this Act, including all claims of the United States and of any State or subdi ision thercol,
shall be proved and filed in the manner provided in this section. Claims which are not filed
within six months after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors shall not be
allowed . .. " (Italics added). An exception, however, provides that a court may, in
its discretion, "before expiration of such period and for cause shown, grant a reasonable
fixed extension of time for the filing of claims by the United States or any State or sub-
division thereof..."
19. § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1946). While bankruptcy amendments adopted in 1926, 44
STAT. 662 (1926), neither required tax claims to be filed and proved nor eliminated the
requirement that the court order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and owing, this
legislation reduced taxes to a sixth priority by § 15, 44 STAT. 644, 662 (1926) which
amended § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Colin, An Analysis of the 1926 Amend-
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sarily impossible in an orderly liquidation, allowance of interest on tax claims
required a periodic recomputation of every unsecured creditor's propor-
tionate share. Under the Chandler Act, therefore, preferential treatment of
tax claims became extremely unwieldy from an administrative point of view.
Despite these significant revisions in bankruptcy legislation since the Act
of 1898, the tax claimants in the Saper case nevertheless contended that
section 57(j) of the Chandler Act, when properly interpreted, allowed in-
terest on tax arrearages to the date of payment. This section bars allowance
of "debts owing to the United States, a State, county, district or munic-
ipality . . . as a penalty or forfeiture . . . except for . . . the pecuniary
loss sustained by the act . . . out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose
. . . and such interest as may have accrued theret n according to law." 3 Ignor-
ing the impropriety of applying a section hinged to penalties and forfeitures
in cases where no penalty or forfeiture was involved, tax claimants seem to
have pursued an intricate line of reasoning: where the interest rate imposed
by statute 21 is so high as to be a penalty disallowed by section 57(j), the
pecuniary loss (i.e., tax debt) could nevertheless be recovered in bankruptcy,
and courts have repeatedly construed the last clause of section 57(j) to
authorize reasonable interest thereon until the date of payment; this interest
survives bankruptcy and accrues until the pecuniary loss is paid, inasmuch
as the pecuniary loss itself survives bankruptcy under the provisions of
section 17 prohibiting discharge of tax debts; aforliori, where the statutory
interest is reasonable to begin with, interest should be permitted to accrue
until the pecuniary loss is paid. 22 And they asserted that the Supreme Court
inmets to the Bankruptcy Act, 26 CoL. L. Rnv. 7S9, 802 (1926) ; Me, ArnGIIL, An!mEm-
m=roF rnE BAN R pTcY Acr 340, 344-47 (1927); 3 CoL.urm 2047. Since the Chandler
Act merely lumped the first three priorities established by the 1926 amendments into the
present first priority category (administrative costs), it did not affect the relative priority
position of tax claims. Because the present third priority expenses are seldom incurred,
pre-bankruptcy tax claims are usually payable immediately after expenses of administra-
tion and wage priorities. Moore and Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amcndments: Impravc-
inent or Retrogression? 57 YAiLE L. J. 683, 699 (1948). Of course, a priority creditor is an
unsecured creditor who takes precedence only in the distribution of unencumbered assets.
He does not have priority over a secured creditor in property constituting the security.
20. Italics added.
21. Unpaid federal taxes ordinarily bear interest even in the absence of statute.
Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914). Interest on delinquent federal income
taxes, however, has been fixed by statute at 6% per annum. See ITIT. Rnv. Corz § '9(a).
Other federal tax statutes provide for a similar rate of interest. E.g., I.nr. Rnv. Coaz
§ 1420(b) and Ixr. REv. CODE § 1605(b) (Social Security taxes). Most states have a
statutory rate of interest on unpaid taxes. See, e.g., N.Y. TAx LAw § 213; Co::.-. Gzmr.
STAT. (1949 Rev.) §§ 1948, 1953.
22. Validity of this argument is dubious. Neither taxes nor ordinary interest are
penalties. And a proviso dealing with debts owing the United States as a penalty or
forfeiture should have no application beyond penalty and forfeiture cases. See Saper v.
City of New York, 168 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1943). Section 57(j) merely deals with the
distinction between penalties and damages. Thus, where a public contract, e.g., provides
1949]
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at least sub silentio, had twice accepted this interpretation of section 57(j):
once in a pre-Chandler Act case 23 and once in a case arising subsequent to
the Act.24 In addition, they urged that Congress, by re-enacting section 57(j),
had placed its stamp of approval on this construction and intended to in-
corporate it into the Bankruptcy Act.
25
But Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court in the Saper case, rejected
this argument. 26 Implicit in his opinion is the view that the clause permitting
"interest .. . according to law" does not establish any right to interest
after bankruptcy. Section 57(j), the Justice indicated, is inapplicable to any
claim, even interest charges, arising after the petition has been filed; 27 its
function is rather to prohibit the allowance of pre-bankruptcy interest at
rates so high as to constitute a penalty.23 In the exhaustive legislative
for a penalty or forfeiture on breach, the penalty provisions would not be enforceable in
bankruptcy, but the government would be allowed a claim for actual loss resulting from
the breach with interest which may have accrued to an unspecified date.
The notion that § 57(j) independently justifies post-bankruptcy interest on tax claims
probably stems from the fact that the question of disallowance of penalties arises most
frequently in connection with claims for past due taxes where the claim may be valid but
penalties and excessive interest barred. 3 CoLumR 301 and see note 28 Vtpra. Though In
these cases § 57(j) should apply only after the question as to what, if any, interest is
legal has been decided (see Saper v. City of New York, stpra), some courts have construed
the clause "interest . . .according to law" to require allowance of interest to the date of
payment, e.g., In re J. Menist Co., 290 Fed. 947 (2d Cir. 1923), reed on other grounds,
United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304 (1924) ; see Davie v. Green, 133 F.2d 451 (lst Cir.
1943). But while many cases did allow interest until the date of payment under authority
of § 57(j), e.g., In re Beardsley and Wolcott Mfg. Co., 82 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1936), all in-
volved the issue whether interest was to be treated as a penalty. When, as in the present
case, tax agencies take the position that the accrued interest is not a penalty, §57(j)
.should have no effect in its allowance or disallowance. See Matter of Union Beverages,
50 Am.B.R. (N.S.) 825 (D.N.H. 1942), rcv'd sub norn., Davie v. Green, supra. And see
McCormick v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 41 F.2d 213, 214 (3d Cir. 1930): ". . . [A]fter
property of an insolvent corporation has passed into the hands of its receivers, interest as
penalties for the non-payment of taxes are not allowable on claims against the funds .. ."
23. United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304 (1924), rev'g In re J. Menist Co., 290 Fed. 947
(2d Cir. 1923), see note 30 infra.
24. Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Comm'n of Calif., 314 U.S. 564 (1942), see
note 30 infra.
25. This was the basis for the opinion in Davie v. Green, 133 F.2d 451 (1st Cir.
1943), with which Mr. Justice Reed in his Saper dissent agreed, and seems to be the view
of at least two judges in the Second Circuit. See note 11 sipra.
26. See City of New York v. Saper, 69 S. Ct. 554, 559 (1949).
27. ". . . Section 57, sub. j, prohibits allowance of a tax penalty against the bank-
rupt estate only if incurred by the bankrupt before bankruptcy by reason of his own
delinquency." Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57, 59 (1939). See also In re Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., 45 F.Supp. 77 (S.D.Cal. 1942). See Note, 29 VA. L. Rv. 206, 214
(1942) ; Hunt, Bankruptcy Tax Problems, 17 J.N.A. REv. BANKR. 121, 122 (1943).
Penalties on tax claims arising after bankruptcy are provable as a first priority
charge on the estate. Boteler v. Ingels, mpra, and see note 7 supra.
28. For a collection of cases in which the problem of penalties masquerading as in-
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history accompanying the Chandler Act, there is no evidence that Congress
supposed section 57(j) to have a broader meaning.=3 Moreover, the opinion
denied that either of the cases relied on by the tax claimants had held differ-
ently. Although in both cases the court had allowed the collection of tax
claims with interest until payment, the only question decided by these cases
was the legality of the interest rate.-' The propriety of allowing any interest
at all to accrue beyond bankruptcy was not adjudicated.
In disallowing interest on tax claims after bankruptcy, the decision in the
Saper case seems to harmonize judicial treatment of such claims with other
sections of the Act. Those sections which refer to interest provable in bank-
ruptcy, such as section 63(a)(1), which pertains to claims based on judg-
ments and written instruments fixed as to liability prior to bankruptcy, 3t and
section 63(a) (5), which relates to provable debts reduced to judgment after
bankruptcy,3 2 provide that interest accrues only until a petition is filed.- 3
And although tax claims remain unique in that they are always non-dis-
chargeable, 4 retention of this proviso in the Chandler Act was predicated
more on reducing the possibility of tax evasions than on a concern for differ-
entiating such claims from other unsecured debts.35
Furthermore, while the legislative history may be ambiguous, there are
terest is discussed, see 3 Co-Lam 296-301. See Note, 104 A.L.R. SS4 (193G). For the
view that § 57(j) does not authorize post-bankruptcy interest, see Hunt, Tax Claims in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 14 J.N.A. Rnr. BA.TmR. 3, 7 (1939) ; Cf. Kruse, Tax Claims,
Wage Claims and Inheritances, 15 J.N.A. REF. BzA.n. 64 (1941).
29. Neither H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), nor Srm. R-P'. 1916,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), the committee reports on the Chandler Act, discuss the sig-
nificance of § 57(j)'s re-enactment. See 3 CorLnn 1843-4, Cum. Supp. 137; Hunt, Bank-
ruptcy Tax Problems, 17 J.N.A. REr. BANn. 121, 122 (1943) ; Oglebay, Some Recent
Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 17 J.N.A. REF. B.nm. 127, 129-30 (1943).
30. United States v. Childs, note 22 supra, and M1eilink v. Unemployment Reserves
Comm'n of California, note 23 supra. Both cases sustained a statutory ex-ction of interest
amounting to 12% per annum, but neither holding goes further than deciding that not
even high interest rates are necessarily penalties barred by §57(j). Even the court in
Davie v. Green, 133 F.2d 451 (1st Cir. 1943), which sustained post-banruptcy interest on
tax claims, admitted that "this question [whether to allow post-bankruptcy interest] do-s
not appear to have been before the Court in the Mlcilinh case and we are aware of no de-
cision by that Court ... in which it has been considered." Id. at 453.
31. 11 U.S.C.A. § 103 (a) (1) (1948).
32. 11 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (5) (1948).
33. While §§ 63(a) (1) and 63 (a) (5) are rarely invoked in practice, they reflect a
principle of long standing. City of New York v. Saper, 69 S.Ct. 554, 556 n. 10. See 2
BL. Coa Ns. -48S8, and Judge Clark's opinion in Saper v. City of New York, 163 F2d 263,
270 r 6 (2d Cir. 1948).
Nor do the requirements in §57(n), 11 U.S.C.A. §93(n) (1943) and §64(a), 11
U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (1948), that tax claims be paid in full, imply that interest charges after
bankruptcy must be paid to satisfy the statutory mandate. As between general and priority
creditors, "payment in full" usually refers to the payment of the principal of the preferred
claim existing when liquidation proceedings commenced. People v. American Loan &
Trust Co., 172 N.Y. 371, 65 N.E. 200 (1902) ; sec Hammer v. Tuffy, 145 F 2d 447, 449
(2d Cir. 1944).
34. See note 17 supra.
35. The House bill deleted the pro'ision exempting federal taes from discharge, but
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suggestions that Congress would approve the Saper decision. A report ac-
companying a recent proposed amendment to section 57(j) 11 indicated that
the House regarded preferential treatment for interest on taxes as "obsolete"
and based on reasoning no longer applicable in the light of the Chandler
Act.Y Indeed, the House approved the amendment, but the Senate had no
opportunity to act at that session of Congress.I s
For general creditors, the Saper decision presages larger shares when a
debtor's estate is distributed.3 9 Even without interest, priority charges
the Senate refused to accept the change. 83 CONG. REC. 8684 (1938). See statement of
Rep. Chandler, 83 CONG. Rxc. 9106-7 (1938) : "The House bill makes Federal taxes dis-
chargeable, while the Senate amendment retains existing law in the clarifying change.
The Senate felt that if Federal taxes were made dischargeable, it would open the door to
tax evasion. The Treasury Department recommended against the House amendment." A
similar elimination of the exemption from discharge of state taxes was not suggested be-
cause of presumed constitutional limitations. Hearings before the House Committee on
the Judiciary on H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-8 (1937).
The National Bankruptcy Conference has recently attempted to eliminate even this
preferential discharge status of tax claims. HR. 5829, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), pro-
vided that unsecured tax claims, due and owing for more than a year prior to bankruptcy,
were to be deprived of their present fourth priority, relegated to the status of general lun-
secured debts and discharged with other claims when not paid. See Moore and Tone,
Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression? 57 YALE L. J. 683,
701-5 (1948).
36. HR. 5693, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). The bill was introduced by Congressman
Reed, with the support of the National Bankruptcy Conference, March 4, 1948. Section
57(j) would have been altered as follows:
"(1) Debts owing to the United States or to any state or any subdivision thereof as
a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary loss
sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose,
with such reasonable and actual costs occasioned thereby and such interest as may have
accrued [thereon according to law] on the amount of such loss up to the date of bankruptcy.
"(2) Except where the estate of the bankrupt is solvent, interest accruing after the
date of bankruptcy on taxes legally due and owing to the United States or to any State or
any subdivision thereof shall not be allowed." (Matter in brackets eliminated, matter in
italics added.)
See Moore and Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvenent or Retro-
gression? 57 YAiz L. 3. 683, 718-9 (1948), where, prior to the Saper case, the proposed
amendment is described as "clarifying and in line with a sound, but not judicially accepted,
construction of the present Act." See also Oglebay, Some Develofnnents in Bankruptcy
Law, 21 J.N.A.REF.BANXR. 105, 106-7 (1947); Snedecor, Taxes and Tax Claimns, 23
J.N.A.REF.BANxK. 47 (1949).
37. H.R. REP. 2083, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948). "The addition of clad'se (2) [see
note 36 supra] is intended to overrule an obsolete rule as to interest on delinquent tax
debts. . . .Although . . .the Chandler Act ... [rendered] obsolete the reasoning in
the Kallak case, nevertheless its rule has not been changed, and therefore requires this
statutory modification." Relevant sections of this Report are set forth in City of New
York v. Saper, 69 S. Ct. 554, 560 n. 17 (1949).
38. The amendment was passed by the House on June 8, 1948, and referred to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on June 9, 1948, but no action was taken by the Com-
mittee prior to adjournment or at the subsequent special session of Congress.
39. See N.Y. Herald-Tribune, March 15, 1949, p. 31, col. 5. Tax Situation in Bank-
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attributable to the mushroom growth of taxing units," the multiplication of
taxes in number and kind, 41 and the swollen rates characteristic of current
levies, often leave but meager remains for non-priority unsecured creditors
to apportion.42 Before the Saper case, the superimposition of high statutory
rates of interest on this constantly expanding base reduced even further the
recovery of ordinary creditors.4 Moreover, the inexorable accrual of in-
terest often dictated a hurried liquidation which was disadvantageous to
creditors and was a factor in discouraging the trustee from advancing possi-
bly meritorious defenses to asserted claims. 4" And when liquidation was
necessarily time consuming, creditors who were not responsible for the delay
in payment were the ones ultimately penalized through the allowance of
interest charges.
45
ruptey, 18 J.N.A.REF.BANKR. 17 (1943), cites a bankruptcy proceeding where disallow-
ance of the interest claim would have provided a sum sufficient to pay general creditors
a dividend of 10%. These proposed changes are resisted by the Treasury Department on
the ground that such a limitation would result in a loss of needed revenue and impose an
impossible burden on tax administration. For a discussion of these proposed changes, see
Olive, Taxes in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 25 TAxF~s 5-10 (1947); Musgrave, The Tax
Priority Bugaboo, Copm. REORG. AND BAN. R-v. 43 (1945) ; Tax Situation in Banhruptcy,
18 J.N.A.REF. BANKR. 17 (1943) ; Comnmcrcial Law Lcague Ban!ruptcy Committee Rc-
port, 19 J.N.A.REr. BANyR. 113, 114-8 (1945).
40. See Hunt, Bankruptcy Tax Problems, 17 J.N.A.Rr.BANrn. 121 (1943): "Now-
adays we have a multiplicity of taxing units, all desperately seeking to collect whatever
they can... We might well define the average bankrupt estate as: 'A body of money...
entirely surrounded by taxes." JoNEs, METRoroLITAN GovEmU.NENT 16 (1942), cites
the horrible example of Cook County, Ill. with a total of 35S governmental units. For
other expressions of alarm at the proliferation of tax levying bodies, see Beyer, Financial
Dictators Replace Political Bosses, 22 NAT'L MuN. R-v. 162 (1933); Porter, A Plague
of Special Districts, id. at 544.
41. See Comment, Municipal Real Estate Taxation as a; Instrument for Community
Planning, 57 YALE L. J. 219, 220 n. 4 (1947), listing many new taxes imposed by munici-
palities to supplement inadequate revenue from traditional property taxes. See also, Drab-
son, New Sources of Income for Municipalities, 25 TAXEs 499 (1947); Roesken, Tax
Trends in Central States, 25 TAxEs 949 (1947).
42. See Matter of Raflowitz, 43 Am B.R.(N.S.) 358, 361 (D. Conn. 1940), rcv'd, 37
F.Supp. 202 (D. Conn. 1941) : "Taxing authorities and collectors are not responsible for
a single dollar's worth of goods on any bankrupt's shelves, or for one single fixture in
his store and every penny paid in tax priorities is at the expense of the general creditors:'
43. Tax officials filing claims for accumulated taxes plus interest helped make the
interest-bearing arrearage still larger by laxity in asserting and collecting claims before
bankruptcy ensued. Earlier presentation and payment might have reduced the amount of
interest charges and made a greater portion of the debtor's estate available to creditors.
When collectors were dilatory, these tax delinquencies often went unsuspected. Conse-
quently, creditors were lured into extending credit and failed to recover advances used to
satisfy these arrearages. Montgomery, Recent Developments and Proposed Reforms in
Respect to Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 19 J.N.A.REr.BA Rm. 31 (1944) ; foore and Tone,
Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression? 57 YALE L. J. 683,
704 (1948).
44. Hunt, Bankruptcy Tax Problems, 17 J.N.A.RF. BAN.,M. 121, 122 (1943) ; Note,
96 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 270, 271 (1948). See Saper v. City of New York, 16S F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1948).
45. In re Union Fabrics, 73 F.Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), see note 9 mspra, illustrate3
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But while the Saper decision will undoubtedly improve the position of the
general creditor, this gain may well come at the expense of the debtor's stake
in rehabilitation. Interpretation of the Court's opinion to mean that interest
on tax claims ceases altogether when bankruptcy ensues would safeguard
the debtor's interests. 46 Presumably, however, the case holds only that in-
terest accruing after a petition is filed is not provable in bankruptcy; it does
not seem to affect the proviso of section 17 that bars discharge of tax claims
not satisfied out of a debtor's assets.47 Under this construction, the debtor
henceforth will probably emerge from bankruptcy with undischarged in-
debtedness increased by the amount of interest denied tax claimants 9
Assets which formerly were applied to payment of non-dischargeable tax
claims will now be consumed in payment of claims which would be discharged
whether paid or not.
Thus the Saper case abolishes an anomaly in the operation of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. It alters a rule which was often unfair to creditors, vexing to
trustees, and perhaps inconsistent with Congressional intent. But unless
the Saper case can be interpreted as halting the accrual of interest under
the t x statutes, only Congressional amendment of section 17 can relieve
debtors from the claims of taxing agencies.
49
how creditors might be penalized through delays incident to orderly, liquidation if interest
were allowed on tax claims. In 1939, an involuntary petition was filed against the debtor
corporation which listed assets of $19,881.11 and claims of $89,128.76. Tax claims alone
aggregated $11,526.27. Turnover proceedings against the president of the bankrupt re-
sulted in three unsuccessful appeals to the Supreme Court. This litigation, consuming six
years, was concluded when creditors accepted $30,000.00 in settlement. Had interest been
allowed, tax claims would have been augmented by 48%, virtually surpassing the total
assets of the estate when the petition was filed. For another illustration, see Tax Simalon
in Bankruptcy, 18 J.N,A. REF.BA NR. 17 (1943).
46. The Saper decision does not affect dischargeability of the principal amount of tax
arrearages. Interest, however, is not part of the tax, but something in addition to the tax.
Capital Building & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 848 (1931); Penrose v.
United States, 18 F.Supp. 413, 415 (E.D.Pa. 1937). And though some time must elapse
between the time a claim is filed and the date of payment, the court leaves unanswered the
question whether interest accruing on pre-bankruptcy taxes after a petition is filed will
survive payment in bankruptcy of the principal claim which gave it birth. To say that
interest does not survive is only to say that, in effect, interest ceases to run, despite the
revenue statutes, because bankruptcy ensues. Under this construction, the prohibition
against discharging tax claims would be avoided since there would be no interest to dis-
charge.
47. While the possibility of making interest on tax claims dischargeable by judicial
construction is not referred to in the Supreme Court opinion, the lower court indicated
that "the fact that the bankrupt may not have received an immunity he might desire is not
ground for upsetting the statutory scheme of distribution of the estate in the hands of
the trustee. . ." Saper v. City of New York, 168 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1948).
48. Interest on tax arrearages is only another instance of the burden placed on debtors
by the present non-dischargeability of tax claims. See note 35 .rupra. Of course, where
the debtor is a corporation whose existence is terminated by bankruptcy, possible subse-
quent liability for unpaid interest becomes academic.
49. Proposals to amend § 17 have already been placed before Congress. See note 35
"ispra.
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